Although North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops cooperated and occasionally conducted joint operations, they usually operated in different areas. forces on Vietnam's battlefield: the regular units of the North Vietnamese Army (NVA), which exploited a conventional form of warfare, and the National Liberation Front, also known as the Viet Cong, which used guerrilla warfare tactics coupled with conventional doctrines. 3 Max Boot branded the conventional war effort as "futile" in Vietnam and claimed that the Americans' defeat was mainly the result of "a military establishment that tried to apply a conventional strategy to an unconventional conflict." 4ĭouglas Porch went further when he stated that counterinsurgency could not work in Vietnam and that it "often made the problem worse in the view of the population." 5 Two military foes threatened the U.S. Westmoreland, marginalized counterinsurgency in favor of conventional war tactics. Military Assistance Command Vietnam's (USMACV) commanding officer, General William C.
military's approach to Vietnam was "unidimensional" and that a traditional approach to warfare was adopted in Vietnam with conventional war doctrines.
U.s. backing insurgency how to#
Army "resisted any true attempt to learn how to fight an insurgency" but pre ferred to treat Vietnam as a conventional war. Writers have frequently blamed the military for its tendency to favor conventional military tactics in a country deemed to be plagued by an insurgency. armed forces' strategy in Southeast Asia. Since the end of the Vietnam War in 1975, orthodox historians have highly criticized the U.S. and South Vietnamese forces succeeded in defeating the Viet Cong insurgency by the spring of 1972. As they skillfully synchronized regular warfare with counterinsurgency, the U.S. and Communist documents, this study suggests that the Americans succeeded in offsetting the Communists' tactical approach to hybrid warfare. Vietnam was a hybrid warfare theater, which required the Americans to fight both the Viet Cong guerrillas and Hanoi's conventional forces. force's reliance on conventional warfare against the guerrillas progressively morphed into a strategy that fully supported the military's counterinsurgency initiatives. This article opposes these theories and suggests that by 1969, the U.S. Counterinsurgency programs were labeled weak and powerless to shift the Americans' momentum against the Viet Cong, which outsmarted the U.S. military's so-called reliance on conventional warfare in a country deemed to be plagued by an insurgency. In the past decades, most conformist studies dedicated to the Vietnam War were overly critical of the U.S.
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